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Maine's Battle in America's Other Drug War:
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
v. Walsh
By Lynsey Mitchel*
"To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with
serious consequences to the nation. '
I. INTRODUCTION
At the time this article is being written, prescription drug policy is
once again on the law-making agenda. President Bush signed the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
into law on December 8, 2003.2 The federal legislation contains a
prescription drug discount for Medicare recipients that may impact
the future of state-led initiatives regarding states' ability to lower the
*This article is dedicated to GLM, an excellent attorney, and even better
father. The author wishes to thank Professor Ogden at Pepperdine University
School of Law for suggesting this topic.
1. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 85 (1st Cir.
2001) (quoting, New State Ice. Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
2. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.A.). The purpose of the act is to:
amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide for a voluntary
program for prescription drug coverage under the Medicare Program, to
modernize the Medicare Program, to amend the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 to allow a deduction to individuals for amounts contributed to health
savings security accounts and health savings accounts, to provide for the
disposition of unused health benefits in cafeteria plans and flexible
spending arrangements, and for other purposes.
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price of prescription drugs. 3 This idea will be explored in Part IV of
this article.
The fight for cheaper prescription drugs has been termed
America's other drug war. Almost four years ago, the Maine
legislature started a battle for lower-cost prescription drugs that
ended in the Supreme Court. On May 11, 2000, Maine legislators
signed into law the Act to Establish Fairer Pricing for Prescription
Drugs and established the Maine Rx Program, the nation's first state
price control mechanism, to reduce prescription drug prices for those
not qualified for Medicaid or who do not have another superior
prescription drug plan. 4
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA), a trade association that represents over one hundred
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, challenged the
legislation and won an injunction in October 2000. 5 A year later, the
appeals court lifted the injunction but kept the legislation on hold
awaiting Supreme Court review. 6 On May 19, 2003, the Supreme
Court ruled against PhRMA.7 Maine Rx Plus, a revamped program,
is slated to go into effect in January 2004.8
Part II of this case note examines the background of prescription
drug pricing, the relationship between Medicaid and the Maine Rx
Program, PhRMA's constitutional challenges to the Maine legislation
and a summary of the lower court opinions. Part III includes an
analysis of the Supreme Court's opinion. Part IV discusses the
impact of the case, including the revised program and the possible
federal solution. Part V concludes the discussion of Walsh.
3. Id.
4. 2000 Me. Laws 786.
5. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. 1855, 1863-64
(2003).
6. Id. at 1865-66.
7. Id. at 1871.
8. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. Tit. 22, § 2681 (West 2004).
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Same Drug, Different Price
Prescription drug expenditure and retail prices in the United
States have increased dramatically in recent decades.9 Americans
spent $140.6 billion on outpatient prescription drugs in 2001, a
15.73% increase over 2000 spending and a tripling of 1990 figures.' 0
Along with expenditure, retail and manufacturer prescription prices
have increased." Retail prescription prices have gone up 7.3% per
year from 1992 to 2002, while manufacturer prices have gone up
3.6% per year during the same period. 12 Pharmaceutical company
profits are also on the rise. In 2001, the pharmaceutical industry had
the highest profit to revenue ratio of any industry. 13 Many perceive
differential drug costs and high prices as unfair and have called for
governmental drug cost regulations. 14 However, the pharmaceutical
industry believes that the ultimate cost to be paid by governmental
regulation is decreased innovation. 15
Americans on the whole also pay higher prices for their drugs
than other developed countries.1 6 Maine's close proximity to Canada
9. Stephen R. Latham, Pharmaceutical Costs, An Overview and Analysis of
Legal and Policy Responses by the States, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 141, 141-44 (2003).
Latham's article cites numerous factors for the increase in drug expenditures such
as an aging population and that physicians are switching their patients to newer,
higher priced drugs.
10. Id.
iI. THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PRESCRIPTION DRUG TRENDS (May 2003),
available at
http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/Ioader.cfm?url=/commonspots/security/getfile.cfm&pa
geid=14267. For comparison purposes, the report noted that the average inflation
was 2.5%.
12. Id.
13. Latham, supra note 9, at 150.
14. See Martha Ann Holt, International Prescription Drug Cost Containment
Strategies and Suggestions for Reform in the United States, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 325, 325-26 (2003).
15. Id.
16. Farin Khosravi, Price Discrimination in the United States: Why are
Pharmaceuticals Cheaper in Canada and are Americans Seizing the Opportunities
Across the Border?, 9 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 427,429 (2003).
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highlighted the issue of differential prices of drugs. For example,
Chellie Pingree, the Maine senator who sponsored the Maine
legislation, accompanied Maine seniors to Canada and reported that
the group saved $18,000, in the aggregate, on their prescription
drugs. 17  Health insurance companies, including managed care
organizations, and government health plans are able to procure lower
priced drugs since they can negotiate with drug manufacturers as
large purchasers.' 8  As a result, people without prescription drug
benefits, either because they do not have health insurance or do not
qualify for state programs such as Medicaid, pay the highest prices.
B. The Federal Medicaid Statute, the Maine Rx Program and
Prescription Drugs
1. The Background of Medicaid and the Maine Rx Program
Medicaid became law in 1965 and finances health care for people
with low-incomes defined as "families with dependent children and
of aged, blind or disabled individuals, whose income and resources
are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services."' 19
Since Medicare was mentioned earlier in this article, it should be
clarified that Medicaid is a separate program than Medicare.
Medicare provides financing for health care for persons over the age
of sixty-five. 20  Entitlement to Medicare is based upon age, not
need.21 The Medicaid program is a federal/state partnership and
provides states with the flexibility to set up their own eligibility
requirements, payment for services and covered benefits.22 In order
to participate in the Medicaid program, a state must have their
Medicaid plan approved by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid,
the agency who administers the program on behalf of the Secretary of
17. Id. at 428.
18. John Rother, Advocating for a Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, 3
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 279, 281 (2003).
19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396 (West 2002).
20. STEPHEN J. WILLIAMS & PAUL R. TORRENS, INTRODUCTION TO HEALTH
SERVICES 17 (Delmar Publishers 5th ed.) (1999).
21. Id.
22. 42 C.F.R. § 430 (2001).
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the Department of Health and Human Services.23  Although
outpatient drugs are an optional benefit under Medicaid, all states
provide them to their Medicaid-eligible citizens.
24
The original Maine Rx Program was established for Maine
citizens whose combined assets and income exceeded the
qualifications for Medicaid, but yet who are also without another
prescription drug benefit.25 The Maine Rx Program was sweeping in
who was allowed to take advantage of lower-priced drugs. Unlike
Medicaid, there were no income ceilings and unlike Medicare, no age
requirements.
26
Although the Maine Rx Program was independent of Medicaid, it
was nonetheless tied to Medicaid in two key ways. First, the actual
cost to Medicaid for prescription drugs is reduced by rebates that
manufacturers are compelled to pay to the states. 27  This federal
rebate agreement is based on agreements between the manufacturer
and the Secretary of Health and Human Services and is uniform
across the states. 28 Had the Maine Rx Program been implemented,
participating drug manufacturers would have been required to pay the
same rebates to Maine Rx participants that they pay under the
Medicaid program. 29 Second, drug manufacturers who did not elect
to participate, essentially not entering into a rebate agreement with
the state under the Maine Rx Program, would then have their drugs
subject to prior authorization in Maine's Medicaid program. 30
Essentially, state legislators wanted to use Maine's leverage as a large
purchaser of drugs in the Medicaid program to provide cheaper drugs
for its other citizens without prescription drug coverage.
23. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a (West 2002).
24. THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID OUTPATIENT PRESCRIPTION DRUG
BENEFITS: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY, 2003 (December 2003), available
at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/loader.cfm?url=commonspot/security/getfile
25. 2000 Me. Laws 786, § A-5(2).
26. Id.
27. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-8 (West 2002). This section, titled "Payment for
covered outpatient drugs," specifies that states are only eligible for federal
payments if a drug manufacturer has entered into an agreement with the Secretary
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human services or with the state itself.
28. Id.
29. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1862.
30. Id. at 1863.
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2. Rebate Agreements
The Federal Medicaid Rebate Program was passed by Congress
in 1990 as a cost-saving measure so that state governments could
reduce their costs for prescription drugs. 31 This legislation mandated
that manufacturers had to enter into rebate agreements with either the
federal government or with individual states in order to qualify for
Medicaid payments. 32 Similarly, the Maine legislation directed the
Commissioner of Maine's Department of Health Services to
negotiate rebate agreements with manufacturers equal to the federal
Medicaid rebates. 33
The commissioner was to consider the rebate amount calculated
under the Federal Medicaid Rebate Program and to then use his or
her best efforts to obtain an initial rebate in the same amount. 34
Therefore, the Maine Rx Program would have allowed citizens of
Maine, without any other prescription drug benefit, "to buy drugs
from retail pharmacies at a discount roughly equal to the rebate on
Medicaid purchases." 35 The participant would have been charged the
discounted price set by the state and then the state would have used
the funds obtained from the manufacturers to reimburse pharmacies
for the discounts. 36
3. The "Bite" of Prior Authorization
In order to create an incentive for manufacturers to participate in
the Maine Rx Program, the statute provided that the names of
manufacturers who did not enter into agreements be released to
health care providers and the public.37 Even more significant than
negative publicity, the program required the drugs of non-
participating manufactures to be subject to prior authorization when
31. Id. at 1861.
32. Id. at 1862.
33. Id. at 1863.
34. Id. at 1863.
35. Id. at 1862.
36. Id. at 1863.
37. Id. at 1863.
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prescribed for Medicaid program participants.38 Subjecting a drug to
prior authorization means that before a person can receive a
prescription, a state agency must approve the request.39 Prior
authorization can be a "bite" or motivation to participate since
subjecting a drug to prior authorization "sharply reduces the drug's
market share and sales, as the prior authorization causes a shift of
patients to competing drugs of other manufacturers that are not
subject to a prior authorization. 40
It is important to note that under the Medicaid program, the
Social Security Act permits states to subject any Medicaid-covered
outpatient drug to a requirement of prior authorization as long as the
state complies with certain requirements. 41  These requirements
include certain safeguards such as that prior authorization requests
will receive a response within twenty-four hours, and that in
emergency situations seventy-two hour supplies of drugs will be
provided while requests are pending.42 The Maine Rx Program was
written to comply with these regulations. 4
3
C. The Constitutional Challenges to the Rx Program
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA) challenged the constitutionality of the Maine Rx
legislation by asserting that the program violated the Supremacy
Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause.44 The background of
38. Id.
39. Jagan Nicholas Ranjan, Medicaid and the Unconstitutional Dimensions of
Prior Authorization, 101 MICH. L. REV. 602, 603 n.9 (2002). Ranjan stated that:
a state could declare Rogaine subject to prior authorization. As a consequence
of this designation, any time a physician prescribed Rogaine she would have to
make a telephone request to a state commission. Only after permission by the
commission could the drug be prescribed. The commissioner must respond by
telephone or another telecommunication device within 24 hours of the request.
See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-8(d)(5)(A) (West 2002).
40. Walsh, 123 S. Ct at 1864.
41. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-8(d)(5)(A-B) (West 2002).
42. Id.
43. 2000 Me. Laws 786, § 7. The Act states that "[t]he department shall
impose prior authorization requirements in the Medicaid program under this Title,
as permitted by law .... Id.
44. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1860.
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each of these areas of law will be discussed below.
1. Federal Preemption and Prior Authorization
PhRMA believed that imposing a prior authorization requirement
on non-participating manufacturers was a threat to coerce
manufacturers into reducing their prices on sales to non-Medicaid
recipients.45 The organization alleged that this portion of the Maine
Rx Program was unconstitutional under the doctrine of federal
preemption since the Maine Rx Program did not relate to Medicaid
purposes, but instead imposed a significant burden on Medicaid
recipients. 46 In their brief, the petitioners distinguished using prior
authorization for Medicaid uses, such as policing quantity and refill
limits for waste and preventing fraud, from using prior authorization
as a way to make drug companies participate in the Maine Rx
Program. 47
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution is the starting point for
an analysis of whether or not the Maine Rx Program is preempted by
the federal Medicaid statute. Article VI provides that "[t]his
Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land...
,48 The Supremacy Clause mandates that federal law trumps any
state regulation where there is an express conflict between the two
sets of legislation. 49 However, there are other less overt types of
preemption such as implied field and implied obstacle preemption.50
Implied field preemption occurs where "Congress has legislated so
comprehensively that it has left no room for supplementary state
legislation." 51 Since both Congress and the states maintain regulatory
power over Medicaid, the relevant type of preemption in this case is
45. Id. at 1867.
46. Id. at 1860.
47. Brief for Petitioner Walsh (No. 01-188) at 4.
48. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
49. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 12.1-12.7 (3d ed. 1999).
50. Ranjan, supra note 39 at 606 & n.30.
51. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham Co., 479 U.S. 130, 140 (1986).
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implied obstacle preemption. 52
Under implied obstacle preemption, there is a presumption
against preemption. 53  This presumption is especially powerful
"[w]here coordinate state and federal efforts exist within a
complementary administrative framework, and in the pursuit of
common purposes." 54 The relevant standard is whether or not the
Maine Rx Program is preempted by federal law because the "state
law interposes an obstacle to the achievement of Congress's
discernable objectives." 55 The key then to determining whether or
not there is preemption is determining congressional intent. The
Supreme Court ultimately had to determine whether or not
Congress's intent concerning Medicaid prior authorization should
preempt the Maine Rx Program.56
2. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The Constitution provides Congress with the power "[t]o regulate
commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States. 57
Therefore, when a state regulation concerning commerce is at odds
with federal legislation, the supremacy clause holds that the federal
statute dominates.58 When Congress has not spoken clearly, the
negative command, known as the dormant Commerce Clause,
"prohibits states from acting in a manner that burdens the flow of
interstate commerce." 59 PhRMA argued that the rebate requirement
violates the dormant Commerce Clause since it "constitutes
52. Grant's Dairy-Me., LLC v. Comm'r of Me. Dep't of Agric., Food & Rural
Res., 232 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2000).
53. Walsh, 123 S. Ct at 1869.
54. Dept. of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973).
55. Grant's Dairy-Me., 232 F.3d at 15 (vacated by Gibson v. Phillips, 352 U.S.
874 (1956)).
56. For a more in depth discussion of the models of interpretation see R.
Randall Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court
and Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-Making, 25 PEPP. L. REv. 37
(1997). See also Ranjan supra note 39 at 609-19.
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
58. For an overview of the Commerce Clause see also ROTUNDA, supra note
49, at §§ 11.1, 11.10.
59. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 79.
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impermissible extraterritorial regulation, and second that it
discriminates against interstate commerce in order to subsidize in-
state retail sales."
60
Statutes that violate the dormant Commerce Clause typically fall
into one of these categories including 1) statutes that are per se
violations of the Commerce Clause, 2) statutes that discriminate
against interstate commerce, and 3) statutes that evenhandedly
regulate commerce and have only incidental effects on interstate
commerce. 61 PhRMA argued that the Maine Rx Program was a per
se violation of the Commerce Clause. Per se violations result when a
"statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the
boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting
State's authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute's
extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature." 62  A state
statute is subject to strict scrutiny if it discriminates against interstate
commerce either on its face or in practical effect and will only be
upheld if the state can "show that it advances a legitimate local
purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives." 6
3
PhRMA relied on the holdings of three cases, Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig Inc., Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc., and Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., to argue that the Maine
Rx Program is a per se violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.
64
The Court found a per se violation of the price affirmation statute in
Seelig.65 In that case the Court struck down a New York statute that
set minimum prices for milk purchased from producers, including
producers within New York and other states, and banned the resale of
milk that had been purchased for a lower price.66 In this case, Seelig
60. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1870.
61. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 79.
62. Id. (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).
63. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100-01
(1994).
64. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1870-7 1.
65. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935). The Court held
that "such a power, if exerted, will set a barrier to traffic between one state and
another as effective as if customs duties, equal to the price differential, had been
laid upon the thing transported." Id.
66. Id.
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a milk dealer in the city of New York, bought milk from producers in
Vermont at lower prices than it would have had to buy from milk
producers in New York.67 Justice Cardozo wrote that "New York has
no power to project its legislation into Vermont by regulating the
price to be paid in that state for milk acquired there. , 68
The rule that came from Seelig was later applied in Healy.69 In
Healy, the Court struck down a Connecticut Liquor Control Act that
required out-of-state shippers of beer to affirm that the prices at
which the products were sold to Connecticut wholesalers were no
higher than prices at which those same products were sold in
bordering states.70 Similarly, in Brown-Forman, a New York statute
required liquor distillers to affirm that their prices were no higher
than the lowest price at which the same product would be sold in any
other state during the month. 71  The Court held that the statue
violated the commerce clause since "[f]orcing a merchant to seek
regulatory approval in one State before undertaking a transaction in
another directly regulates interstate commerce." 72
However, both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court found
that these statutes, unlike the Maine statute, involved regulating
prices charged in other states in order to benefit the buyers and sellers
67. Id. at 520.
68. Id. at 521.
69. Healy, 491 U.S. 324.
70. Id. at 336. The Supreme Court also stated in Healy that:
Taken together, our cases concerning the extraterritorial effects of state
economic regulation stand at a minimum for the following propositions:
First, the 'Commerce Clause... precludes the application of a state statute
to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether
or not the commerce has effects within the State .... ' Second, a statute
that directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of
a State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State's authority and is
invalid regardless of whether the statute's extraterritorial reach was
intended by the legislature. The critical inquiry is whether the practical
effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the
State.
Id.
71. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
575-76 (1986).
72. Id. at 582.
Spring 2004
92 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 24-1
in the home state, resulting in a direct burden on the non-home state
buyers and sellers.73 Part III will further illuminate how the Court
determined that this rule did not apply in Walsh.
D. Lower Court Opinions
1. United States District Court: Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America v. Commissioner
PhRMA filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in the United
States District Court of Maine against the Commissioner of the
Maine Department of Health Services and the Maine Attorney
General in order to stop the Maine Rx Program from going into
effect.74 The district court concluded that the plaintiffs likelihood of
success on both of their constitutional claims, including that the
Maine program violated the dormant Commerce Clause and was
preempted by the federal Medicaid Act, was "overwhelming." 75 As a
result the court imposed an injunction against the state on October
26, 2000.76 A court in determining whether or not to grant a
preliminary injunction may consider the likelihood of success on the
merits, the risk of irreparable harm, the balance of the inequities and
the public interest.77 The district court primarily ruled for PhRMA
based upon its likelihood of success on the merits and briefly
disposed of the remaining factors.
78
First, the lower court examined whether or not the rebate program
violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Maine attempted
to avoid the constitutional issue by claiming that they were not
regulating, but were rather exercising their market power as a volume
purchaser of prescription drugs in the Medicaid program.7 9 The
73. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 81; Walsh 123 S. Ct. at 1871.
74 . Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of America v. Commissioner, CIV.00-157-B-H
(D. Me. 2000) available at
http://www.med.uscourts.gov/site/opinions/hornby/2000/dbh_10262000_1-
00cvl57_pharma vcommr-me.pdf
75. Id. at 16.
76. Id.
77. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 72.
78. Commissioner, at 16.
79. Id. at 6.
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Supreme Court has ruled that states acting as buyers rather than
regulators are not subject to the Commerce Clause and may "favor its
citizens over others." 80 For example, in South-Central Timber Dev.,
Inc. v. Wunnicke, the Supreme Court held that Alaska ceased to be a
participant in the market and became a regulator when Alaska
attempted to use its leverage in the timber market, where it was a
participant, in order to exert a regulatory effect in the processing
market, in which it was not a participant.8' The district court rejected
Maine's argument and held that the state is subject to the Commerce
Clause since Maine was acting in its regulatory capacity in trying to
achieve a social, regulatory goal.82
Second, the court had to determine if the rebate program violated
the Constitution's Commerce Clause. 83  The court concluded that
Maine burdened interstate commerce since it attempted to regulate
the prices paid in earlier transactions in other states. 84 The court
agreed with PhRMA's analogy of the holdings in three cases,
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig Inc., Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc, and
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., to the
Maine Rx Program. 85 The court reasoned that the Maine statute was
similar to the New York statute in Seelig which attempted to regulate
the price of milk in other states. The court held that "[i]f we change
the names of the states, and substitute prescription medications for
milk" the outcome is the same.86
Last, the court had to conclude if making drugs manufactured by
non-participating companies subject to prior authorization was
80. Id. See, e.g. White v. Massachusetts, 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (the state was
not subject to the Commerce Clause in limiting its construction projects to firms
that employ 50% Boston residents); Reeves Inc. v. Stakes, 447 U.S. 429 (1980)
(the Court allowed South Dakota to sell its cement only to South Dakota residents).
81. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 96-98 (1984).
82. Id.
83. Commissioner, at 8.
84. Id. at 9. Referring to distributors buying drugs from manufacturers located
outside of Maine. The lower court stated that "the practical effect of what Maine
has done here is to limit the revenue an out-of-state manufacturer can obtain when
it sells drugs to out-of-state distributors that ultimately send or bring the drugs to
Maine." Id.
85. Id. at 9-10.
86. Id. at 9.
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preempted by federal Medicaid law.87  Since federal law did not
expressly forbid the type of program that Maine passed, the court had
to determine if there was implied preemption, essentially if Maine's
legislation was inconsistent with Medicaid objectives.88 The federal
statute the court relied on states that drug distribution must "provide
such safeguards as may be necessary to assure that . . . care and
services will be provided, in a manner consistent with simplicity of
administration and the best interests of recipients."8 9  The court
determined that the program was inconsistent with Medicaid
objectives since Congress had not suggested that the federal
Medicaid program could be used to further the interests of non-
Medicaid recipients. 90 The court held that "no matter how modest an
obstacle the new prior authorization amounts to, it is an obstacle--
drugs on the list must be approved by the state Medicaid Medical
Director before they can be dispensed or prescribed." 9' The court
reasoned that even if the Maine Rx Program would "not deny a single
Medicaid recipient access to the safest and most efficacious
prescription drug therapy" it was preempted nonetheless. 92
2. First Circuit Court of Appeals: Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America v. Concannon
A three-panel judge sitting for the First Circuit Court of Appeals
in Boston, vacated the preliminary injunction based upon their
conclusion that there was no conflict between the Medicaid Act and
the Maine Rx Program since PhRMA did not establish that prior
authorization would likely harm Medicaid recipients. 93 The court
also concluded that Maine's statute did not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause. 94
The court of appeals first examined whether or not the prior
87. Id. at 11.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 12 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(19) (West 2002)).
90. Id at 12.
91. Id at 13.
92. Id. at 12 (quoting Def. Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 29).
93. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 85.
94. Id.
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authorization requirement conflicted with the purposes of the
Medicaid program so as to violate the Supremacy Clause. Unlike the
district court, the appeals court found "no conflict between the Maine
Act and Medicaid's structure and purpose." 95 The court based its
decision on the fact that the Medicaid statute explicitly permits
covered outpatient drugs to be subject to prior authorization. 96 The
court reasoned that Maine could subject all drugs in their Medicaid
program to prior authorization if it so desired. The court found
compelling the fact that when a state's Medicaid Drug Utilization
Review Committee subjects a drug to prior authorization they are
guided by the principle that Medicaid recipients must be assured
access to all medically necessary prescription drugs. 97
The court dismissed PhRMA's argument that interference, in this
case prior authorization, is tolerable when performed within the
confines of the Medicaid program, but unacceptable when used to
motivate manufacturers for another program. The court concluded
that the Medicaid statute "is [not] concerned with the motivation
behind imposing prior authorization" as long as the program
complies with the prior authorization guidelines. 98 Second, the court
reasoned that even if motivation plays a role, there were still
Medicaid purposes that the Maine Rx Program fulfilled. This
reasoning negates the district court's contention that "if Maine can
use its authorization over Medicaid authorization to leverage drug
manufacturers' rebates for the benefit of uninsured citizens, then it
can just as easily put the rebates into a state program for highway and
bridge construction or school funding."99 The appeals court laid out
several Medicaid purposes that the Maine Rx legislation could have
potentially accomplished which are discussed in full in Part III of this
article. 00
The court, after holding that the Maine Act was not preempted by
95. Id. at 75.
96. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-8(l)(A) (West 2002)).
97. Id. at 76. Kevin Concannon, the Commissioner of the Maine Department
of Human Services, affirmed in an affidavit that the Department would not impose
prior authorization that would conflict with the Medicaid requirements. Id.
98. Id. at 76.
99. Commissioner, at 13.
100. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 76; see infra Part III and accompanying notes.
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the Medicaid statute, considered PhRMA's Commerce Clause
challenge. 0 1  Unlike the district court, the appeals court
distinguished the three cases that PhRMA relied upon (Seelig, Healy
and Brown-Forman) as involving price control, price affirmation or
price tying schemes unlike the Maine statute. 0 2 The court stated that
the Maine Rx Program did not interfere with regulatory schemes in
other states, but ultimately would have regulated activity that
occurred in Maine. Unlike the statutes from these cases, Maine
neither "requires the rebate to be a certain amount dependent upon
the price of prescription drugs in other states," nor "impose[s] direct
controls on a transaction that occurs wholly out-of-state."' 1 3 The
court concluded that there was no extraterritorial reach and therefore
the program was not per se invalid under the Commerce Clause.'°4
After rejecting PhRMA's per se invalidation claim, the court
considered if the statute still violated the Commerce Clause under the
Pike balancing test. 10 5 The Pike balancing test is applied when a
"statute regulates evenhandedly and has only incidental effects on
interstate commerce."'10 6 Under the test, the court had to weigh the
possible putative local benefits advanced by the statute against any
possible burdens placed on interstate commerce. 10 7  The court
identified the potential loss of profits for manufactures as one
potential burden, but noted several possible local benefits including
increased access to prescription drugs for citizens who could
otherwise not afford them.'0 8
The court of appeals lifted the injunction placed by the lower
court since it concluded that PhRMA was not likely to succeed on the
101. Id. at 79.
102. Id. at 81.
103. Id. at 82.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 83. The district court did not apply the test since it concluded that
the statute was a per se violation of the Commerce Clause. Id.
106. Concannon, 249 F. 3d at 83.
107. Id. at 83-84 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
The court recognized the "difficulty in foreseeing what events actually will occur"
and noted that this uncertainty made the Pike balancing test more challenging to
apply. Id. at 84.
108. Id. at 84.
merits of their claims. 10 9 PhRMA petitioned the Supreme Court for
review and the Court granted certiorari in June 2002.110
III. ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION
On May 19, 2003, in a six to three decision, the Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the appeals court and lifted the injunction
against the Maine Rx Program."' Although most of the Justices
agreed with the court of appeals, their justifications were diverse.
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the court, and Justices Breyer,
Scalia, and Thomas contributed concurring opinions for specific parts
of the opinion.
In Parts I and II of the opinion, Justice Stevens summarized the
Maine Rx Program, focusing on the prior authorization component,
including the backdrop of rising prescription drug costs.1 12 He noted
that states, such as California and Georgia, as early as 1982 put in
place prior authorization requirements in their Medicaid programs." 
3
Since there were no federal laws or regulations concerning prior
authorization, states included their prior authorization components in
their Medicaid plans that were approved by the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 114  Congress
sanctioned the practice of prior authorization when it created an
amendment contained in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act in
1990."' Since 1990, section 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(1)(A) explicitly
allows state Medicaid plans to have prior authorization
components. "16
109. Id. at 84-85.
110. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1860.
111. Id. at 1871.
112. Id. at 1861-63.
113. Id. at 1861. See also Dodson v. Parham, 427 F.Supp. 97, 100-01 (N.D.
Ga. 1997); Cowan v. Myers, 232 Cal. Rptr. 299, 301-02 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
114. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1861.
115. Id. (citing Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990)).
116.42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-8(d)(1)(A), (5) (West 2002).
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A. Prior Authorization
1. Justice Stevens' Plurality Opinion
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsberg and Breyer,
pointed out in Part IV of the opinion that because the Court was
reviewing for an abuse of discretion concerning a preliminary
injunction, the Court's decision did not determine the ultimate
validity of the Maine Rx Program since there were no evidentiary
hearings or fact findings.' 17 Justice Stevens further tempered his
opinion with the warning that "no matter how we answer the question
whether petitioner's showing was sufficient to support the
[preliminary] injunction, further proceedings in this case may lead to
a contrary result."' 8 "Further proceedings" includes a final ruling
by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.1 19 The issue before
the Court concerned a preliminary injunction, and is "different from
the question that would be presented if the Secretary, after a hearing,
had held that the Maine Rx Program was an impermissible
amendment of its Medicaid Plan."120 Justice Stevens noted that a
future determination by the Secretary that subjecting drugs to prior
authorization under Maine's Medicaid program in order to secure
rebates for the Maine Rx Program is impermissible, would be
"presumptively valid."' 2' But the Court could not rely upon an
evidentiary hearing or a ruling by the Secretary, therefore the issue
before the Court was "whether there is a probability that Maine's
program was pre-empted by the federal statute's mere existence." 1 22
In Part V of the opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Souter and Ginsburg, noted that the district court awarded the
injunction because potential interference with the delivery of
Medicaid benefits, without any benefit to the federal program, is
prohibited by federal statute according to the doctrine of obstacle
117. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1866.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1866-67.
121. Id. at 1867.
122. Id.
preemption. 23 The district court looked to the fact that Maine had
"failed to identify any 'Medicaid purpose' in its new authorization
requirement." 124 Congressional intent is embodied in federal
Medicaid law that requires state plans to comply with numerous
requirements, including that they "provide such safeguards as may be
necessary to assure that eligibility for care and services under the
plan will be determined, and such care and services will be provided,
in a manner consistent with simplicity of administration and the best
interests of the recipients. "125 However, Maine did not offer a
Medicaid purpose because they thought it unnecessary since federal
law already permitted Medicaid programs to have a prior
authorization component. 126 Justice Stevens wrote that the district
court erroneously relied on a waiver theory. PhRMA had the "burden
of establishing, by a clear showing, a probability of success on the
merits." 127  It was PhRMA's burden to show that there was no
Medicaid-related goal or purpose served by the Maine Rx
Program. 
28
Justice Stevens remarked that the court of appeals identified two
Medicaid-related purposes that the Maine Rx Program may have
served.129  First, the program would have provided lower priced
pharmaceuticals to people who can be described as "medically
needy" even if they do not qualify for Medicaid. 130  Second, the
Maine Rx Program had the potential to lower Medicaid costs by
enabling uninsured people to purchase prescription medicines.
13 1
Access to medications could prevent conditions from worsening and
prevent further financial hardship making it less likely that Maine
123. Id.
124. Id. (emphasis in the original).
125. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(19) (West 2002).
126. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1867. See also supra note 116.
127. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1867.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. The court acknowledged that there was "some factual dispute
concerning the extent to which the program will also benefit no needy persons" Id.
However, the court dismissed this concern since "the potential benefits for no
needy persons would not nullify the benefits that would be provided to the neediest
segment of the uninsured population." Id.
131. Id.
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residents would end up in the Medicaid program and require more
expensive treatments. 132 Justice Stevens also noted that "[a] third
rather obvious Medicaid purpose" is that prior authorization in the
Medicaid program can protect beneficiaries from inappropriate
prescriptions and save money by promoting the use of the most cost-
effective prescription drugs.133
However, potential benefits to the Medicaid program would not
justify the Maine Rx Program if it "severely curtailed Medicaid
recipients' access to prescription drugs."' 134  Justice Stevens wrote
that it was appropriate for the district court to assume that the prior
authorization component would fully comply with federal
requirements of Medicaid and not severely curtail Medicaid
recipients' access to prescription drugs. 135
In addition, Justice Stevens noted that states do not have to be
motivated by Medicaid-related goals in choosing the contours of their
Medicaid program. 136  He wrote that states have "substantial
discretion to choose the proper mix of amount, scope and duration
limitations on coverage"137 and the motivation of a state policy does
not limit this scope. 138  For example, Pennsylvania can choose to
exclude abortions from its Medicaid program based upon their state
132. Id. at 1867-68.
133. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1868. A doctor who testified for Maine stated that
prior authorization can "ensure proper use of prescription drugs with a high
potential for inappropriate use" and "encourage the use of cost-effective
medications without diminishing safety or efficacy." Id. at 1864 n.23.
134. Id. at 1868.
135. Id. at 1869 The Court allowed the assumption even though in prior cases,
the district court had made a fact finding that the state's Medicaid "care and
services [were] provided in the 'best interest of the recipients."' Id.(quoting
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303 (1985) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(19)). The Medicaid Act allows states to "choose the proper mix of
amount, scope, and duration limitations on coverage, as long as care and services
are provided in 'the best interest of the recipients."' Id. In Alexander, the Court
examined a Tennessee Medicaid measure that reduced the number of annual
inpatient hospital days and found that the reduction did not deny beneficiaries
"meaningful access to medical services." Alexander, 469 U.S. at 302-03.
136. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1869.
137. Id.(citing Alexander, 469 U.S. at 303).
138. Id.
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policy interest in encouraging normal childbirth.' 39  Likewise,
Maine's state policy interest in protecting the health of its uninsured
residents provides a justification for prior authorization since the
Medicaid Act contains no "categorical prohibition against reliance on
state interests unrelated to the Medicaid program itself." 1
40
Justice Stevens stated that it was improper for the district court to
impose an injunction against the Maine Rx Program on the
determination that federal Medicaid law preempts the program as
long as the prior authorization component posed some obstacle, no
matter how modest, to realizing federal Medicaid goals.141 A modest
impediment to the accessibility of prescription drugs does not
provide a sufficient basis for preemption of the Maine Rx
Program. 142 Justice Stevens refers to the rule from New York State
Department of Social Services. v. Dublino. 143 In that case, there was
a preemption challenge to a state statute that imposed employment
requirements as conditions for continued eligibility for Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits that went beyond
the federal requirements. 144  The mere fact that the New York
program imposed a nonfederal obstacle to continued eligibility for
benefits did not provide a sufficient basis for preemption. 145  The
Court wrote in Dublino that "[t]he problems confronting our society
in these areas are severe, and state governments, in cooperation with
the Federal Government, must be allowed considerable latitude in
attempting their resolution."' 1
46
Justice Stevens then concluded Part V with a reiteration that the
question of whether the Secretary's approval must be sought before
the Maine Rx Program may go into effect was not before the
Court. 147 He repeated that the Court offered no opinion as to whether
139. Id. (citing Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445 (1977)).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1870.
142. Id.
143. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1869 (citing New York State Dept. of Soc. Servs. v.
Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (quoting Dublino, 413 U.S. at 413).
147. Id. at 1870.
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it would be appropriate for the Secretary to approve or disapprove the
Maine Rx Program. 148
2. Justice Breyer's Concurring Opinion
Justice Breyer concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.
In Justice Breyer's concurring opinion, he agreed with Justices
Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg that a modest impediment standard was
too low, but added that in order for PhRMA to prevail, they must
demonstrate that Maine's program would seriously compromise
important federal interests. 149 Therefore, the district court could not
award an injunction to PhRMA simply by the showing that there may
be a modest harm. 150 Justice Breyer noted that Congress "would not
have intended to forbid prior authorization programs virtually per
se-i.e., on the showing of slight harm--even if no specific
Medicaid-related benefit is apparent in a particular case." 15t  He
believed the injunction should be vacated since there was no in-depth
examination of the Medicaid-related benefits and harms. 52 Justice
Breyer commented that the Medicaid statute provides the framework
for the analysis since it requires states to file their Medicaid plans for
the Secretary's approval.153
Justice Breyer also suggested that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction should be invoked. 154  The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction would allow the district court to refer the question to the
148. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1870.
149. Id. at 1872 (citing Arkansas Elec. Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 374, 389 (1983)).
150. Id.
151. Id. (emphasis in the original).
152. Id.
153. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1872.
154. Id. at 1873 (citing United States v. Western Pacific R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59,
63-65 (1956)). See also Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 826 P.2d 730, 735-
42 (Cal. 1992). Farmers Insurance Exchange refers to two policy goals of
invoking primary jurisdiction 1) to promote uniformity, and 2) the need for the
agency's expertise. Id. at 737. The court also noted the doctrine serves a
procedural goal as well since agency approval of a disputed practice may put an
end to the conflict. Id.
Secretary. 155 Primary jurisdiction "seeks to produce better informed
and uniform legal rulings by allowing courts to take advantage of an
agency's specialized knowledge, expertise, and central position
within a regulatory regime."156 The HHS is institutionally better able
to determine harm that may be caused to Medicaid beneficiaries and
determine if the Maine Rx Program can further Medicaid-related
goals. 157  The law would then grant significant weight to the
Secretary's conclusions under Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. 158
3. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia also wrote a concurring opinion. 159 His opinion
stated rather simply that PhRMA's remedy for Maine's failure to
comply with the obligations it has agreed to undertake under the
Medicaid Act is set forth in the statute itself. 160 PhRMA must seek
enforcement of the Medicaid conditions by the HHS. He concluded
his opinion by stating that PhRMA "may seek and obtain relief in the
courts only when the denial of enforcement is 'arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the
law."'161
4. Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment to overturn the
injunction, but he wrote that the plurality glossed over the Medicaid
155. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1873.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1872.
158. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, (1984). See also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). In
Chevron, the Court held that "federal judges ... have a duty to respect legitimate
policy choices made by those who [have a constituency]." Chevron, 467 U.S. at
866. The Constitution vests the political branches with "[t]he responsibilities for
assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between
competing views of the public interest." Id.
159. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1873.
160. Id. at 1874.
161. Id. at 1874 (quoting 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A) (West 2003)).
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Act's complexity.' 62 The Medicaid Act "represents a delicate balance
Congress struck between competing interests-care and cost,
mandates and flexibility, oversight and discretion." 163 Justice
Thomas wrote that while PhRMA relies on federal law section 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19), which refers to the best interests of the
recipients standard, there are other competing purposes such as cost
control and the need for states to possess broad discretion in order to
control access to prescription drugs.1 65 Justice Thomas noted that it
is too difficult to invoke obstacle preemption based upon an arbitrary
selection of one purpose to the exclusion of others. 166 He determined
that it is impossible to define purposes in "complex statutes at such a
high level of abstraction." 167 Justice Thomas argued that "[b]oth the
plurality and the dissent fail to explain how a State's purpose (and
there may be many) in enacting a prior authorization program makes
any difference in determining whether that program is in the 'best
interests' of Medicaid beneficiaries". 168 He believed that a focus on
the subjective intent of the state legislature in enacting the Maine Rx
Program is an "irrelevant question." 169
Justice Thomas then argued that the plurality and dissent did not
give proper credence to the role of the Secretary. 70 The Secretary's
mandate from Congress "is to conduct, with greater expertise and
resources than courts, the inquiry into whether Maine Rx upsets the
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1874.
165. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1874.
166. Id. See also Note, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term Leading Cases,
Federal Statutes & Regulations, 117 HARV. L. Rev. 449, 449-50 (2003). The note
stated that "[w]hile most of the Justices were willing to compare the purposes
behind the state and federal laws in deciding the preemption question, Justices
Scalia and Thomas came up with an intriguing joinder." Id. The Justices
determined that "because the federal Medicaid statute expressly authorizes the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to approve or reject state Medicaid plans,
courts lack authority to determine whether a state's plan poses an obstacle to the
federal program's purposes." Id. The authority for such a determination "belongs
instead to the Secretary." Id.
167. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1874.
168. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396(a)(19) (West 2002)).
169. Id. at 1876.
170. Id.
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balance contemplated by the Medicaid Act."' 7 1 Justice Thomas noted
that PhRMA should only seek judicial review if the Secretary
approves the plan, like PhRMA has done in previous cases.172
Thomas believed that the Court cannot use obstacle pre-emption to
determine whether or not the Maine Rx Program serves Medicaid
goals, stating "'it is Congress rather than the courts that pre-empts
state law."' 1
73
In closing, Justice Thomas also raised the issue that based upon a
contracts analogy and the Spending Clause, PhRMA has no standing
to challenge the legislation, but noted that Maine did not pursue this
type of challenge.' 74 Under contract law, a third party can only sue if
they are the intended beneficiary of the contract. 175  Therefore,
Justice Thomas argued that PhRMA cannot challenge the law since
PhRMA is not a beneficiary to the contract. 176
5. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence in part and Dissent in part
Opinion
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy, wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part
with the majority opinion. Justice O'Connor agrees with the plurality
that Maine cannot impose prior authorization without a Medicaid
purpose. 177  She wrote that the starting point for a preemption
analysis is determining Congressional intent. 178  Unlike Justice
Thomas who believed that the subjective intent of Maine in imposing
prior authorization was an irrelevant question, the dissent believed
that intent controlled the case. Justice O'Connor stated the only
171. Id. at 1877.
172. Id.; see also Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 259
F.Supp.2d 39 (D.D.C. 2003).
173. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1877-78 (quoting Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt.






181. Id. at 1879.
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purpose which can motivate a state to impose prior authorization is to
reduce Medicaid costs, not to "generate revenue for purposes wholly
unrelated to its Medicaid program."'1 81  She then concluded that
although the Medicaid Act does not expressly prescribe that states
cannot use prior authorization to accomplish goals for their non-
Medicaid population, it is nonetheless an inherent prohibition in the
structure of the Medicaid Act.
182
Justice O'Connor and the other dissenting Justices did not believe
it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to rule in favor of
PhRMA.183 An injunction was proper because, unlike the Court of
Appeals, it was not the district court's sua sponte responsibility to
brainstorm potential Medicaid-related purposes. 184  The plurality
presented three possible Medicaid-related purposes that the Maine Rx
Program may have furthered. The first two possible Medicaid-
related purposes were that 1) people who do not qualify for
Medicaid, but need coverage, will have access to medical benefits,
and 2) Medicaid costs can be lowered if people have access to
prescription drugs, thereby reducing the chance that they will end up
in the Medicaid program needing more expensive treatments.
185
However, Justice O'Connor argued that this claim is an "attenuated
causal chain" that was not presented before the district court. 86 The
dissent also noted that the plurality's third potential Medicaid-related
purpose lacked facts to support it in the record. 187 The plurality
stated that the Maine Rx Program will necessarily produce cost
savings for Maine's Medicaid program.' 88 However, Justice
O'Connor wrote that this conclusion is flawed since unlike prior
authorization programs which are based upon efficacy and cost-
effectiveness, the prior authorization component in this case would
be solely based upon a manufacturer refusing a rebate agreement
with the state.189
182. Id. at 1879.
183. Id. at 1878.
184. Id. at 1881.
185. Id. at 1880-81.
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The dissent concluded their opinion with the statement that the
district court had before it "concrete evidence of the burdens that
Maine Rx's prior-authorization requirement would impose on
Medicaid beneficiaries."' 90  However, the district court had no
evidence about potential Medicaid-related purposes. Therefore, the
court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining the Maine Rx
Program. 191
B. Dormant Commerce Clause
In Part VI of the opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer, examined PhRMA's Commerce Clause challenge regarding
the rebate agreement component of the Maine Rx Program. PhRMA
argued that the rebate requirement constituted impermissible
extraterritorial regulation and that it also discriminated against
interstate commerce in order to subsidize in-state retail sales. 192 The
Court did not find either of these arguments to be persuasive.' 93
The Court agreed with the court of appeals that "unlike price
control or price affirmation statutes, 'the Maine Act does not regulate
the price of any out-of-state transaction, either by its express terms or
by its inevitable effect."",194 The Court also examined West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy for its applicability to the present case. 195 In
West Lynn, the Court examined a Massachusetts statute that imposed
an assessment on all milk sold by dealers to in-state retailers which
was then distributed to Massachusetts dairy farmers. 96 The Court
held that the statute "imposed a tax on out-of-state producers to
subsidize production by their in-state competitors" and thus violated
the Commerce Clause because of its discriminatory effect.' 97 Unlike
West Lynn, however, the Court held that the Maine Rx Program
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1881-82.
192. Id. at 1857.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1871.
195. Id. (citing W. Lynn Creamery, Inc., v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994)).
196. Healy, 512 U.S. at 186.
197. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1871.
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would not impose a disparate burden on any competitors. Justice
Stevens concluded that "[a] manufacturer could not avoid its rebate
obligation by opening production facilities in Maine and would
receive no benefit from the rebates even if it did so."'
' 98
Justice Scalia also concurred in rejecting PhRMA's Commerce
Clause challenge.199 He opined that the dormant Commerce Clause
has no text in the Constitution and "not lending itself to judicial
application except in the invalidation of facially discriminatory
action, should not be extended beyond such action and
nondiscriminatory action of the precise sort hitherto invalidated. 2 °°
IV. IMPACT
A. The Maine Rx Plus Program
Two weeks after the Supreme Court lifted the injunction placed
against the Maine Rx Program, Governor John Baldacci unveiled a
revised program named Maine Rx Plus. 20' Maine Rx Plus should go
into effect in January 2004.202 The Maine Rx Program was not
revised, but rather completely revamped. The new Maine Rx Plus
Program limits eligibility to individuals with incomes under 350% of
the federal poverty level, instead of the sweeping eligibility of the
former Maine Rx Program.20 3 Additionally, the program is no longer
tied to Medicaid by a prior authorization component. Instead, it
permits participants to buy all drugs on the state's Medicaid preferred
drug list at Medicaid cost. The program is entirely funded by the
state. Maine estimates that 275,000 residents in 2004 will receive
198. Id. For a more in-depth treatment of PhRMA's dormant Commerce
Clause challenge see Brannon P. Denning, The Maine Rx Prescription Drug Plan
and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine: The Case of the Missing Link[age],
29 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2003).
199. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1873.
200. Id. at 1873-74.
201. Meg Haskell, Maine Rx Plus Ready to Roll, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Jan.




203. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 22, § 2681 (West 2004).
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discounts of up to 25% on name brand prescription drugs and 60% on
generic prescription drugs.204
As soon as the Supreme Court lifted the injunction, predictions
were not favorable that Tommy Thompson, Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services, would approve the
Maine Rx Program. 20 5 In a brief filed by the United States, the
government argued that the prior authorization provision of the
Maine Rx Program was invalid because the program was not tailored
to low-income individuals, but was open to all Maine residents
regardless of their financial or medical need.20 6 Securities analysts
predicted that if the brief was any indication of where Thompson
stood on the issue, the odds appeared better than fifty-fifty that he
would probably rule against the Maine Rx Program or at least tighten
eligibility requirements. 20 7  Further, even if Thompson had been
given a chance to approve the program, it would not have been
protected from future legal battles. Indeed, PhRMA filed an
amended suit September 25, 2003, in Maine District Court, where it
continued to argue that Maine's plan violated the federal Medicaid
statute because it offered no benefits to Medicaid beneficiaries. 20 8
B. A Federal Solution?
Maine citizens claim that measures such as the Maine Rx Plus
Program, are not a real solution. 20 9 Legislators said that despite the
recent passage of the Maine Rx Plus that was put into place to help
204. FDA News.com, Maine Rx Plus Launches; PhRMA Mounts New
Challenge (Jan. 28, 2004), available at http://www.fdanews.com/cgi-
bin/udt/sc.display.ppv?clientid=fdanews&invid=9035&sid=20943&view=V.
205. THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., Prescription Drugs/Drug Companies
Believe HHS Could Impose Limits on Maine Rx (May 21, 2003), available at
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily reports/repindex.cfm?DRID= 17841.
206. Brief for the United States as Amicie Curiae at 20, Pharm. Research &
Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2001) (No. 31156279).
207. THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 205.
208. FDA News.com, supra note 204..
209. The Maine Senate, Maine Counsel of Senior Citizens Organizes




110 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 24-1
seniors and others seeking more affordable prescription drugs and
health care, that "action at the federal level is needed to complete the
job that Maine lawmakers have started. ' 210 Senate Majority leader
and sponsor of the revised program stated that "Maine legislators and
the Governor have led the way nationally in acting to reduce drug
prices, but we can't do it alone. It's time for the federal government
to step up to the plate and take action."211
Other states want solutions as well. In 2002, Shawna Woodward
concluded her article about states waiting for the outcome of Maine's
program with the following quote: "[n]ow that the appeals court has
wiped away the stigma of unconstitutionality, we expect the Maine
approach to move like wildfire across the country." 212 The prediction
was correct as prescription drug policy remained at the forefront of
state legislative agendas in 2003. During last year's legislative
session, forty-nine states had 290 bills pending that concerned some
aspect of prescription drugs. 213  In addition, twenty-five states
considered non-binding resolutions urging the U.S. Congress to take
action.214
All sides of the debate, including PhRMA, state governments and
consumers, have urged for a solution at the federal level. In a
statement from Marjorie Powell, spokesperson for the PhRMA, she
stated that "[r]eal solutions that help rather than hurt patients begin
with passing a Medicare prescription drug benefit for seniors and
disabled persons this year. '"215 Many believe that Medicare, rather
than Medicaid, should "play the key role in providing prescription
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Shawna Lydon Woodward, Will Price Control Legislation Satisfactorily
Address the Issue of High Prescription Drug Prices?: Several States Are Waiting
in the Balance for PhRMA v. Concannon, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 169, 194 (2002)
(citing Physicians For a Nat'l Health Prog., Court Rules in Favor of Maine Rx Price
Controls, at http://www.pnhp.org/Press/2O0/courtrules 6 4 01 .htm.).
213. Nat'l Conference of State Legislators, 2003 Prescription Drug State
Legislation (Jan. 22, 2004), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/drugdisc03.htm.
214. Id.
215. Press Release, PhRMA, Marjorie Powell, spokesperson for the PhRMA
regarding the Supreme Court's Ruling in PhRMA v. Walsh (May 19, 2003)
available at http://www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/ 19.05.2003.731 .cfm.
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drug coverage to Medicare beneficiaries." 216 Time will tell if the
Medicare prescription drug bill signed into law by President Bush on
December 8, 2003 is the cure.217
V. CONCLUSION
How valuable are the lessons from Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America v. Walsh? After all, there was no majority
opinion concerning the issue of preemption, and no evidentiary fact-
finding since the Supreme Court reviewed an injunction put in place
by the district court. Justice Stevens also tempered his opinion by
stating "we offer no view as to whether it would be appropriate for
the Secretary to disapprove this program if Maine had asked the
Secretary to review it." 218
Nonetheless, if nothing else comes from Walsh, it has kept the
nation discussing and brainstorming new solutions regarding
prescription drugs. In America's other drug war, where important
values are pitted against each other, including access versus
innovation and free enterprise versus governmental assistance, it
remains to be seen what a lasting solution will look like at the end of
the day. The good news is that the Court's decision was in line with
Justice Brandeis's quote, "[t]o stay experimentation in things social
and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to
experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the
nation." 219 There is no question that the issue of prescription drugs
will not fade away.
216. THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., Implications of the New Medicare




218. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1870.
219. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 85 (1st Cir.
2001) (quoting New State Ice. Co. v. Liebermann, 285 U.S. 262, 310 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
Spring 2004

